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DECISION. By Richard Harris, New York:

E.P. Dutton & Company,

1971. Pp. 220. $5.95.
The keen political reporting that readers of The New Yorker
have come to expect of Richard Harris is well displayed in this book
drawn, not at all distantly, from a series of articles in that magazine.
He recounts the Senate's decision not to advise and consent to the
appointment of Judge Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court. The
principal actors are of course United States Senators, but his narrative
is at least as much of their staffs and of the lobbyists. Judge Carswell
himself hardly appears, certainly never as a person with any purpose in
life other than to be available for the particular controversy-no doubt
the use of Judge Carswell that history will also make. The President
and his staff appear only as the butt of insults by Senators and their
staffs, attacks not so much on impure motives as on incompetence in
influencing the Senate. A full account of the transaction would include
more complete studies of many people and groups outside the Senate and
the anti-Carswell lobby; but a full account, perhaps like David Danelski's
exemplary study of the confirmation of Justice Pierce Butler,' would be
political science or history rather than journalism. Even as journalism,
and readily granting a pitch of excitement that would match Allen
Drury, Decision has its faults. The most serious is that the author so
closely shares the political instincts of those who defeated Carswell that
he also shares thdir hyperbole and simplism. The most obvious is that the
leitmotiv for nobility is orchestrated so loudly that it drowns out most
of Senator Bayh's words.
One of the reasons it is hard to write with consistent objectivity about
the politics of Supreme Court appointments is the curious ambivalence
of our major metaphors for that Court's function. On one hand, the
business of finding statutes unconstitutional is seen as simply a byproduct of the day-to-day course of litigation, preferring Marbury's
claim or Madison's because one legal text is of greater authority than
the other. A court whose greatest function were so conceived should be
run like any other and staffed by those whose strong suits are personal
probity and legal craft, persons equipped and disposed like Mr. Justice
Roberts "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares
1. D. DANELSKI, A SUPREME CourR JusT~cE Is APoINTE
as DANELSKI].

(1964) [hereinafter cited
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with the former." 2 Thus, Hamilton stressed the need for the artificial
reason and judgment of law:
[I]t will readily be conceived, from the. variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of
mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably
swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.
Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society, who
will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of judges.'
On the other hand, judicial review is made the principal element in the
great enterprise of subjecting political appetites to fundamental limits.
A court so conceived would be directed more by wise statecraft than by
skill in applying legal rules, "[f]or

.

.

. everything turns upon the

spirit in which [the judge] approaches the questions before him."'
Theory urges that these qualities could exist together; practice reminds
us that there are Brandeis and the others. So we forgive Marshall
his excluded middle and petitio principii as willingly as we would Judge
Hand his otherworldly notions of judicial review.
The trouble is that Carswell had neither virtue. His published
district court opinions are not even the "first rate second rate" that
Holmes originally thought of Taft,' and of Carswell's larger moral impulses little, perhaps blessedly, is known. The evidence against Carswell
is solid, but not so overwhelming as Harris makes it seem. It is true that
Carswell was often reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
but too many explanations are possible to call that fact "stunning,"'
and it no more shows "that whatever else Judge Carswell was, he was
not the 'strict constructionist' of the Constitution that President Nixon
claimed him to be"' than it does that the Fifth Circuit tends to reverse
itself. Had Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo been federal district judges
during the period of their great dissenting opinions, one suspects that
their reversal rate would have exceeded Sutherland's, Van Devanter's or
McReynolds', particularly if it is true that appeals are most likely where
the law is least settled. After all, more than 97 per cent of Carswell's
2. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
4. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12 (1930).
5. 1 HOLmEs-LASKI LETTERS 339 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
6. R. HARRIS, DECISION 101 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HARRIS].
7. Id. at 102.
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decisions were not appealed.' And the fact that Carswell was once
reversed "as being 'clearly in error'-an uncommonly harsh statement
for such a court to make"' would be more convincing if courts of appeals
were not in many circumstances forced to affirm judgments not "clearly
0
erroneous."'
There is similar exaggeration in making out the case that Carswell
used his official positions for illicit segregationist ends. For example,
four. black juveniles were convicted for participating in a demonstration,
sentenced to a reformatory and then released after they filed a suit to
desegregate the institution. Judge Carswell dismissed the case when
the plaintiffs were no longer subject to the segregated institution,"1
which no more makes him "a man who really, personally, does not like
black people" than Brandeis' action in the Atherton Mills case' makes
him a friend of capitalists who brutalize working children.
There was other evidence more convincing of Carswell's lack of
commitment to racial justice: his overtly racist campaign speech at age
twenty-eight, which Senator Brooke is probably right in thinking beyond
the age of forgivable youth; his tendency to abuse civil rights lawyers,
although most lawyers who have lost cases important to themselves
would recognize the probable overstatement in the recitals of unfairness;
and his role in incorporating a private club which acquired the previously
municipal Tallahassee Golf Club, although it is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court is less clear than Mr. Harris that such subterfuges are
illegal." The golf club incident perhaps received more attention than it
intrinsically deserved because that was the subject on which Judge Carswell attempted to mislead the Senate.
All this is a fair case against Judge Carswell. Not that he was actually
incompetent so much as utterly undistinguished; the chairman of the
American Bar Association's Committee on Federal Judiciary put it
reasonably accurately, although drawing perverse conclusions, when he.
wrote: "[the published opinions] neither gave promise of outstanding
scholarship nor did they foreclose it."' 4 Neither would his laundry list.
Mere unforeclosed p9ssibility of legal talent might be tolerable in a
Supreme Court Justice if there were prospects of a grand vision of the
8. Walsh, Selection of Su preine Court Justices, 56 A.B.A.J. 555, 557 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Walsh].

9. HA.IS, supra note 6, at 53.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
11. HAmus, supra note 6, at 53.
12. A. Bicrt, UNPTJBLISNED OPINIONS OF MR.JUSTIcE
13. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
14. Walsh, supra note 8, at 557.
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1-20 (1957).
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Court's role and a dedication to its great ends. The absence of both
qualities is totally damning of a nominee, but is probably not a politically
effective case. It is easy to see why lobbyists went beyond, to the case that
Carswell wickedly used his official power to harass blacks and others to
the best of his (feeble) ability. Yet the reporter should not follow the
attack without question.
Another problem in reliably assessing particular Supreme Court
appointments is the indefiniteness with which ultimate authority is
assigned. President Nixon probably blundered tactically, and certainly
historically, when he wrote Senator Saxbe: "The question arises whether
I, as President of the United States, shall be accorded the same right of
choice in naming Supreme Court Justices which has been freely accorded
to my predecessors .... ""s Even if the President meant not to consider
Tyler a predecessor (his score was one for six), he could hardly disclaim
Washington, 'Madison, Quincy Adams, Jackson, Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan,
Grant, Cleveland or Hoover, all of whom were formally denied at least
one appointment by the Senate. The President continued: "The fact
remains, under the Constitution it is the duty of the President to appoint
and of the Senate to advise and consent."' But why it should be their
duty to consent to his nomination, rather than his to take their advice, is
left unsaid. It is equally strange to suggest, as Harris does, that the
appointment of Carswell "was a gross violation of the Constitutional rule
that the three branches of government must be separate and equal."'"
While the Carswell confirmation was before the Senate, Charles
Black published a note arguing that "there is just no reason at all for
a Senator's not voting . . . on the basis of a full and unrestricted review,

not embarrassed by any presumption, of the nominee's fitness for the
office."' 8 A heartening footnote is given by Harris' report that Senator
Schweiker, after reading Black's article and being led to study the Constitutional Convention, reversed his premature endorsement of Carswell.
Another problem in choosing Justices, or writing about the choice,
is that a judge's future often seems unpredictable from his past. Scigliano
concludes "that about one justice in four whose performance could be
evaluated did not conform to the expectations of his appointer. . .. ""
Lawyers' culture celebrates many such instances, prosecutor to Earl
Warren, Klansman to Hugo Black, and so on. On careful examination,
15. HARRIS, supra note 6, at 155.
16. Id. at 156.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79
YALE L.J. 657, 663 (1970).
19. R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRE iDENcy 147 (1971).

BOOK REVIEWS

few of these dramatic changes turn out to be both unpredictable and
important. The most famous example is Theodore Roosevelt's appointment of Holmes, based on evaluation of Holmes' willingness to bust the
trusts; his dissent in the Nothern Securities case'0 was a disappointment.
But by and large Roosevelt must have been satisfied with Holmes. 2
Similarly, few who knew Senator Black seriously thought that his appointment would advance the racist cause; the Klan, which has occasionally
worked to influence Supreme Court appointments,22 was certainly not
known to be working for Black. If the unpredictability of judicial
behavior is a myth, its persistence is nonetheless easily explained; the
reader of Decision will find it almost his only comfort as he is constantly reminded of the fortuities of judicial selection.
PATRICK L. BAUDEt
20. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
21. Roosevelt's letter of inquiry to Lodge shows more concern with Holmes' philosophy than with his stand on concrete issues. Roosevelt was, for example, troubled by
Holmes' views of Marshall but cheered by his Phi Beta Kappa Address. 1 LODGERoosEmvET CORRESPONDENCE 517-19 (1925). But see 6 T. RoosELT, LFrrss 1393 (E.
Morrison ed. 1952), an early negative assessment.
22. See DANELSKI, supra note 1, at 165-66.
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.

To TAX RiEFORm By Joseph A. Ruskay and Richard A.
Osserman. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
1970. Pp. x, 307. $8.95.

HALFWAY

Halfway to Tax Reform would enable an intelligent layman to
learn what was accomplished by the Tax Reform Act of 1969' and to
become aware of many remaining features of the federal tax law which
still need further reform. Although occasionally the authors venture
into state and local taxation, such as the exemption of church-owned
property from state and local taxes,2 the federal income tax receives most
attention. There is also some discussion of needed reforms of the federal
gift and estate tax.2
The book contains an extensive list of what is alleged by many tax
scholars and economists to be tax preferences. To catalog all these tax
1.

Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV. CODE

of 1954).
2. J. RUSKAY & R. OSSERMAN, HALFWAY TO TAX REFORM 14-16 (1970)
after cited as RuSKAY & OSSERIAN].
3. Id. at 125-26, 134-49.
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